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committee's ranking GOP member, William McCulloch, brush
aside their objections to use of the commerce clause as "superficial."
The Whalens also fail to mention the probing discussion of the constitutional issue in the Senate Commerce Committee, for a synopsis
of which interested lawyers must still look to Gerald Gunther's constitutional law casebook.
These authors also ignore several other legal issues. For example, The Longest Debate provides no evidence about whether Lino
Graglia was right when he charged that the legislative histories of
Titles IV and VI show that the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare and the federal courts violated the intent of Congress
when they interpreted the Act as requiring action to achieve racial
balance in the public schools.2o Nor does this book shed any light
on the issue of whether an agreement to deprive someone of rights
created by Title II can be punished as a violation of the civil rights
conspiracy statute.21
These are questions that have troubled judges and legal scholars, but they are not the sorts of things which interest the Whalens.
Consequently, their book is likely to be dismissed by lawyers as useless, while it is rejected by historians as incompetent. These passionate amateurs have recreated the drama of one of the great
congressional battles of the twentieth century, but they have not
written a satisfactory legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Apparently, such a book is, as Senator Everett Dirksen might
have said, an idea whose time has not yet come.

POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW: ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF EUGENE VICTOR ROSTOW. Edited by
Myres S. McDougal' and W. Michael Reisman.2 Dordrecht,
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. 1985. Pp. xi, 460. $96.00.
Robert Scigliano 3

These essays were written to honor Eugene Rostow on his 70th
birthday and imminent retirement (in 1984) from the Yale Law
20. L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE 47-51 (1976).
21. The FBI thought that it could be, but the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia ruled otherwise in United States v. Guest, 246 F. Supp. 475, 485
(M.D. Ga. 1964). See generally Belknap, The Legal Legacy of Lemuel Penn, 25 How. L.J.
467, 480, 508 (1982).
I. Professor Emeritus of Law, Yale University.
2. Professor of Law, Yale University.
3. Professor of Political Science, Boston College.
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School. Their authors are friends of Rostow, many of them also his
colleagues and some his former students as well. The essays are "as
diverse as his interests," extending beyond topics of constitutional
law and jurisprudence to the conduct of foreign policy and nuclear
strategy. I shall limit my review to several essays that treat issues of
constitutional law, for I have neither the space nor the competence
to discuss most of what appears in this interesting collection.4
In Unraveling the Tangled Threads of Substantive Due Process,
Professor Frank R. Strong challenges the general belief that due
process in English and American law prior to the fourteenth
amendment meant only procedural due process and, consequently,
that the substantive interpretation given to that amendment's due
process clause was a break with tradition. Professor Strong argues
that substantive due process, as a protection of property rights, goes
back to the Magna Carta and that, as received in America at the
time of independence, it was the basis for attacks on government
actions expropriating real and personal property or establishing monopolies. According to Strong, it took much of the nineteenth century for substantive due process to be fully received into American
law; by the time it was, ideas alien to the English heritage had entered with it. The most notable was "liberty of contract," which
made substantive due process an obstacle to "legal, economic, and
social reforms." At this point, in 1900, Strong concludes his study
with the promise of a sequeLs
Professor Strong is more successful in showing that English
and American law was solicitous toward property prior to the fourteenth amendment than in showing that it used substantive due process to any significant extent as an instrument of that solicitude.
His evidence does not establish that, prior to the amendment, due
process or the law of the land (its equivalent) was the "common"
basis for attacks on laws that took away property. Strong himself
finds it "passing strange" that Jefferson and other early Americans
did not express their opposition to monopoly in terms of due pro4. For the reader's information, I cite the other essays in this interesting volume, noting again that my failure to discuss them is unrelated to their quality: William L. Morison,
The Viable Vision for the Volatile Society; W.W. Rostow, Planning for Freedom Revisited;
John N. Blum, United Against: American Culture and Society During World War II; Gary J.
Simson, The Role of History in Constitutional Interpretation; Raymond Aron, The Politics of
Human Rights; Lung-Chu Chen, Human Rights and the Free Flow of Information; Roger
Errera, Reflections on Extradition in French Law; Philip Bobbitt, Deterrence and American
National Security; and Myres S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard, The
World Process of Effective Power. Owen M. Fiss, Louis H. Pollak, and Herman W. Liebert
furnished personal sketches of Eugene Rostow.
5. The sequel was F. STRONG, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY
OF SENSE AND NONSENSE (1986).
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cess. It seems quite plain, however, that they saw no connection
between the two. In all of his declamations against the great monopoly of his day, the Bank of the United States, Jefferson never
charged that it violated constitutional due process, although he did
note that it was inconsistent with state laws that specifically prohibited monopoly.6
Does substantive due process owe more to American sources
than to English? "Life, liberty, and property" are more evocative of
the Declaration of Independence than of the Magna Carta and the
common law; indeed, the fourteenth amendment's framers consciously fashioned it from the Declaration's truths. 7 The American
notion of rights-"unalienable," made "secure" by governmentrequires government to justify deprivations of them, and, it seems to
me, the burden of proof upon government increased as the Declaration's influence deepened and spread.
In The Great What-Is-It: The 'War Power,' the late Professor
Joseph W. Bishop questions the use of the phrase "war power." He
notes that this term doesn't appear in the Constitution, and he
doesn't think it helps us "to classify constitutional problems." But
Bishop proceeds "to divide"-that is, to classify-situations in
which war powers issues have been raised, and he seems quite comfortable in his treatment of them. The expression was used, apparently for the first time, when Lincoln reported to Congress in July
1861, on his need "to call out the war power of the Government."s
If Bishop had been seriously interested in the meaning of the phrase
(I suspect he was not), he might have looked at the actions to which
Lincoln referred. He might then have consulted William Whiting's
War Powers Under the Constitution of the United States, published
in 1864, noting especially the distinction the author makes between
the "War Powers of the President, and Legislative Powers of Congress .... "9 I think the trail leads back to Locke's "federative
power" of the executive, "the Power of War and Peace," 10 and from
there it goes forward into article II of the Constitution.
But Bishop handles the war powers well enough in his own
way, and he is pretty tough-minded about it. "Whatever the understanding of the framers may have been," he accepts history's verdict
6. See Opinion, Feb. 15, 1971, in 3 WRITINGS OF THO!'.!AS JEFFERSON 145-53 (A.
Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds. 1904).
7. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459, 2510 (1865-66) (statements ofT.
Stevens and G. Miller in the House of Representatives).
8. Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4. 1861, in 4 COLLECTED WoRKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 426 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
9. W. WHITING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITCTION OF THE UNITED STATES
at i (lOth ed. 1971).
10. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT at para. 146 (1690).
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that the power to make war is essentially an executive function. He
doubts that the War Powers Resolution of 1973 will have its intended effect of restraining presidential warmaking. And he suggests that the Supreme Court could deny the doctrine of military
necessity in Ex parte Milligan because the need for the doctrine had
passed when it rendered its decision in 1866.
Bishop does display some tenderness towards the courts. He
places the main blame for measures taken against Japanese citizens
and aliens in the Second World War on President Roosevelt, his
military commanders, and Congress, not on the Supreme Court for
its decisions in Hirabayashi and Korematsu. If the Court had stood
against them, he says, it might have provoked a "constitutional crisis"; in other words, I suppose, the Court faced high risks of defiance or retaliation. Perhaps there is some inconsistency between
this appraisal and Bishop's willingness (greater than my own) to
trust the courts ("only the courts") to separate pretended from real
emergencies and to decide when they should and should not control
the actions of the other branches.
Bishop's essay cuts a wide swath: conscription, committing the
armed forces to combat, and wartime and other emergency actions
that would be unconstitutional in ordinary times. To do so adequately would require more than the eleven pages of text that the
author devotes to it.
In The Nature of Judicial Review, republished from the Yale
Law Journal, 11 Harry H. Wellington defends judicial review against
the charge that it is undemocratic (he prefers the euphemism
"countermajoritarian"). Wellington observes that all branches of
government have undemocratic features, by constitutional design
(e.g., Senate apportionment) or practice (e.g., the influence of congressional staffs). He considers such features to be a virtue, for they
enable government to protect "longer range concerns." He also
finds judges more virtuous than other officials, for they can best
"examine the views the community expressed in calmer moments"
and thus best express "the moral ideals of the community."
The "real anxiety" over judicial review, says Wellington, is
about its finality: constitutional decisions seem to be irreversible.
Wellington believes, however, that this problem is easy to overstate.
Often decisions do no more than affect the means by which government acts, and not the substance of its actions, as when courts strike
down laws for vagueness or impose procedural rules as in Miranda.
But what is to be done about judicial "mistakes"? Some mistakes,
II.

91

YALE

L.J. 486 (1982).
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Wellington says, can be avoided if judges will refrain from deciding
issues whose effects they cannot see clearly. Other mistakes pose a
more serious problem: they occur when judges misinterpret the
community's moral ideals. Wellington hopes that judges will then
correct themselves, as he thinks the Supreme Court did in modifying (I would add, only slightly) its broad ruling in Roe v. Wade. To
assist judges in keeping judicial review in line with popular opinion,
he encourages "political activity" by those who favor and oppose
judicial decisions, even to the point of "resistance." "Our law," he
says, "must be based on consent."
Professor Wellington does not justify judicial review on traditional grounds, and for good reasons. He could not agree with
Hamilton's thesis in The Federalist No. 78, that the power to strike
down laws is safe because it involves only the exercise of "judgment." Wellington believes that judges do exercise "will" in making law, and that they should continue to do so. Nor could he
argue, like Marshall in Marbury, that judicial review is (or should
be) employed to maintain the limits in the Constitution, and then
only when legislative acts are "expressly forbidden" by it, for the
Constitution does not figure in Wellington's view of constitutional
interpretation. He does seem to paraphrase The Federalist when he
speaks of government examining and expressing the community's
views in its "calmer moments"; but he thinks this task is best done
by the courts, whereas The Federalist assigns it-the task of serving
"the cool and deliberate sense of the community"-to the people's
elected representatives.12
I might put the difference between Professor Wellington and
the founders this way: Professor Wellington makes judges the servants of the people, while the founders made them the guardians of
the people's Constitution. I wonder whether Wellington's conception of the Court's role serves the people as well as the framers'
conception.
I come to my last essay, Professor Charles L. Black's On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment. When Justice Jackson was
asked about this amendment, he could not, he later related, remember what it was, nor could he remember ever having heard an argument based on it.IJ Professor Black undertakes to remedy this
deficiency. The amendment provides that, "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 425 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); see also id. No.
35, at 221 (A. Hamilton), and No. 71, at 482-83 (A. Hamilton).
13. R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
74-75 (1955).
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disparage others retained by the people." Black asks, as Jackson
had done earlier, what these other rights could be. To Jackson, but
not to Black, unenumerated rights were a "mystery." The "two
best sources" for drawing them forth, Black says, are the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution's preamble. Now the
Declaration also refers to unenumerated rights-"life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness" being "among" other inalienable onesbut this is not what catches Black's eye. Rather he is interested in
the meaning that might be teased from words like "liberty" in the
Declaration.
Black finds a model for enumerating rights in Justice Washington's inquiry into the privileges and immunities clause of article IV
in Corfield v. Coryell. But Black does not want to confine ninth
amendment rights to those "which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong of right, to the citizens of all free governments;
and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the
several States .... ";I4 and he certainly does not want to rummage
about in old documents for them. He thinks the ninth amendment
was designed to enable us to discover its unenumerated rights for
ourselves.
Black's method is a way of "reading" not just the ninth amendment, but the entire Constitution. More precisely, it is one of two
favorite ways of changing the Constitution without seeming to do
so. When you encounter general terms in the document, you can
say that the framers were "vague" or you can say that they intended
their meaning to "evolve" (perhaps both), and you have your excuse for giving the terms your own (or "the community's" or "modern-day") meaning. Black, a thoughtful man, recognizes that the
ninth amendment is a more plausible vehicle for doing this than the
due process clause or other "bizarre" methods. And to what end?
Nothing short of "a general system of human-rights constitutional
law." And Black, also a kindly man, softens his rebuke of the founders (with their "negative 18th century" understanding of rights) by
crediting them with realizing and planning for their own future supersession. What then was the point of having a Constitution?
14.

6 F. Cas. 546, 55! (C.C.D. Wash. 1823) (No. 3,230).

